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Absirucr- Combinatorial auction mechanisms have been used 
in many applications such as resource and task allocation, 
planning and time scheduling in multi-agent systems, in which 
the items to be allocated are complementary or substitutable. 
The winner determination in combinatorial auction itself is a 
NP-complete problem, and has attracted many attentions of re- 
searchers world wide. Some outstanding achievements have been 
made including CPLEX and CABOB algorithms on this topic. 
To our knowledge, the research into multi-unit combinatorial 
auctions with reserve prices considered is more or less ignored. To 
this end, we present a new algorithm for multi-unit combinatorial 
auctions with reserve prices, which is based on Sandholm’s work. 
An efficient heuristic function is developed for the new algorithm. 
Experiments have been conducted. The experimental results show 
that auctioneer agent can find the optimal solution efficiently for 
a reasonable problem scale with our algorithm. 
Keywords: Multi-Agent Systems, Combinatorial Auction, 
Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auction, Reserve Price, Winner 
Determination Problem 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In muiti-agent systems, agents need different resources to 
fulfill their tasks, while the units of resources that can be 
allocated are usually limited. How can the limited resources 
be allocated to different agents effectively and efficiently, 
and maintain the fairness at the same time? To allocate the 
resources through auctions is a very promising way. 
In many auctions, a bidder’s valuation for a combination of 
resources is not the arithmetic sum of the individual resource’ 
valuations - it can be more or less. This is often the case, for 
exampie, in bandwidth auctions [ 11, transportation exchanges 
auctions [2], and airport landing slots auctions [3], and so on. 
In traditional auctions, the resources are auctioned se- 
quentially [4]. In this case, if an agent wants to obtain a 
combination of the auctioned resources, it has to estimate 
which other resource it will receive in other auctions, which is 
heavily relied on how other agents will bid. Such an estimation 
or look-ahead is uncertainty due to incomplete information 
about other bidders. This leads to inefficient allocation of 
resources [lOJ. 
Combinatorial auctions can be used to overcome these 
deficiencies. In a combinatorial auction, bidders may submit 
bids on combinations of resources. This allows the bidders 
to express complemen tarities between resources instead of 
speculating the valuation of a resource with the impact of 
possibly getting other complementary resource. Due to above 
advantages, the combinatorial auctions mechanism has been 
applied in the task allocation, planning and time scheduling 
in multi-agent systems where the items to be allocated are 
complementary or substitutable [6118][9J[ IO]. 
In some combinatorial auctions, the seller agents have a 
reserve price for each type of resource, while they have 
multiple units of each kind of resources for sale. To tackle this 
kind of combinatorial auctions, a new algorithm was deveIoped 
based on the existing branch on bids search algorithm for 
combinatorial auctions. The experimental results indicate that 
our algorithm can find the optimal solution efficiently when 
the number of bids is not too big. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section I1 
describes the general winner determination problem. The win- 
ner determination issue in multi-unit combinatorial auctions 
with reserve prices is outlined in Section 111. The algorithm 
for solving the problem is presented in Section IV. A new 
heuristic function with experimental results is given in Section 
V. Section VI concludes this paper. 
11. THE WINNER DETERMINATION PROBLEM 
In the first-price sealed-auctions, the winner determination 
is very easy. Auctioneer agents only need to pick out the 
maximum price from bids for each resource. In a combina- 
torial auction, bidders may submit bids on combinations of 
resources. Winner determination problem (WDP) in combina- 
torial auctions is much more complex. Winner determination 
of combinatorial auctions can be described as follows: 
The auctioneer agent has a set of resources, R = 
{RI, R2, ..., R,}, to sell, and buyers submit a set of bids, 
B = { B I ,  B2, ..., Bn}. A bid is a tuple, Bj =< S j , p j  > , 
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where Sj R is a nonempty set of resources and pj 2 0 
is the price offered for this set of resources. The winner 
determination problem is to label the bids as winning (zj = 1) 
or losing (xj = 0) so as to maximize the auctioneer’s revenue 
under the constraint that each resource can be allocated to at 
most one bidder: 
It is hard to get an optimal solution for this problem: it 
is equivalent to the weighted set packing - a well-known 
NP-complete problem [5 ] .  Much effort has been put on this 
problem. Among all the approaches, the following three are 
typical: 
restricting the bundles on which bids can be submitted so 
that the remaining problem can be solved optimally and 
provably fast 171. 
designing algorithms that are provably fast but fail to find 
an optimal (or even close to optimal) solution to some 
problem instances [6][231. 
designing algorithms that provably find an optimal 
solution but are slow on some problem instances 
[51[81 I%[ I Ol[ 1 11[121[ 1 3 1 ~  141. 
The first approach suffers from similar economic inefi- 
ciencies and exposure problems as non-combinatorial auc- 
tions because the bidders might not be allowed to bid on 
the bundles they desire. The second approach suffers from 
wasting economic efficiency whenever a suboptimat solution 
is settled on (and because the winner determination problem 
is inapproximable, no fast algorithm can guarantee that its 
solution is even close to optimal). Furthermore, suboptimal 
winner determination generally compromises the incentive 
properties of the auction. Due to these reasons, we focus on the 
third approach with the understanding that on some problem 
instances, any algorithm with this approach wit1 take a longer 
time. 
Following the third approach, Sandholm et al. proposed 
the BOB algorithm [13]. In [I41 they proposed CABOB 
which incorporates many of the techniques proposed in BOB. 
CABOB has been implemented and compared with the bench- 
mark algorithm, CPLEX 8.0. The results show that CABOB 
is dramatically faster than CPLEX 8.0 in many cases. The 
search of CABOB runs in a linear space while CPLEX takes 
exponential space, and often runs out of virtual memory [ 141. 
BOB and CABOB are tree search algorithms that branches 
on bids. In [13], Sandholm has proved that the leaves number 
upper bound of the branches on bids tree is ( & + l ) lm/kJ ,  
where k is the number of resources in the bid with the smallest 
number of resources. The number of tree nodes is 2x(No. of 
leaves - 1). 
111. THE WINNER DETERMINATION PROBLEM IN 
MULTI-UNIT COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS WITH RESERVE 
PRICES CONSIDERED 
In some combinatorial auctions, there are multiple indis- 
tinguishable units of each resource for sale. Such auctions 
are called multi-unit combinatorial auctions (MUCA) [20]. In 
some MUCAs, the auctioneer agents have reserve price for 
each resource. They are not willing to sell the resource if the 
bid price is below the reserve price. This type of auctions is 
called multi-unit combinatorial auctions with reserve prices 
considered (MUCARPC). 
The winner determination problem of MUCARPC can be 
formalized as follows: 
Assume the auctioneer agent has a set of resources, R = 
{RI, Rz! ..., Rm}, to sell, qi be the number of units of resource 
i for sale, ri be the reserve price of resource i. All the buyers 
submit a set of bids, B = (B1, Bar ..., Bn}. A bid is a tuple 
Bj =< pjr(91,j,Oz,jr...,Om,j) >, where Q k , j  2 0 is the 
requested number of units of resource k ,  and pj is the price. 
Sj R is a nonempty set of resources which B, bid for. The 
winner determination problem is: 
n 
j=1  
vi f {LZ, ... !m}, “j E (0 ,  I] 
In existing algorithms for MUCA, reserve 
prices of resources are not taken into account 
[ 131 [ 14][ 151 [I 611 171 [ 181 [ 191[20] [2 11. In a MUCARPC, 
if auctioneer agents just consider how to find the maximum 
revenue without considering the reserve price of each 
resource, it is very likely that the following case will occur: 
Assume resources x and y will be auctioned, qz and qv are 
the numbers of units of x and y for sale, respectively. In this 
example, there are 2 units for each resource. There are two 
bids in the auction: 
B~ =< 5500, ( o ~ , ~ ~ v ~ , ~ )  >, B  =< 3 6 0 0 , ( ~ ~ , ~ , ~ ~ , ~ )  > 
Where qf,l = 2, qV,1 = 1, qr,2 = 1, qu,z = 2, the reserve 
prices of x and y are: z = $2400, y = $400. In the MUCA 
algorithms which do not consider reserve prices, bid B1 will 
be the winner for the higher bid price. However, if we take 
reserve prices into consideration, B1 will bring in profits of 
$300, which is less than the profits Bz bring in ($400). So 
choosing Bz as the winner could bring the auctioneer agent 
greater profits. 
With these observations in mind, to maximize auctioneer 
agents’ profits in MUCARPC, we must modify existing algo- 
rithms for MUCA. 
Some literature in economy provides formalization descrip- 
tions for MUCARPC [22], whereas no detailed algorithms for 
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solving the winner determination problem were reported. In 
the next section, we will present the MUCARPC algorithm 
we developed to solve the WDP in MUCARPC. MUCARPC 
algorithm incorporates many of the techniques proposed in 
BOB algorithm [13]. Since Sandholm has proved that BOB 
can find optimal solution accurately, we have reasons to 
believe that the MUCARPC algorithm can also find optimal 
solution. 
IV. DESCRIPTION F MUCARPC ALGORITHM 
The skeleton of our algorithm is a depth-first branch-and- 
bound tree search that branches on bids. The set of bids that 
are labeled winning OR the path to the current search node 
is called IN, and the set of bids that are winning in the best 
allocation found so far is I N * .  Let f' be the value of the best 
solution found so far. Each bid, Bj , has an exclusion count, 
e j ,  that stores how many times Bj  has been excluded by bids 
on the path, R' is the set of resources that are still un-allocated, 
and g is the profits from the bids with xj = 1 on the search 
path so far. h is the total profits of the bids that can be added in 
the search tree at current search node. l?i is the tally being kept 
for resource i , which denoting the number of units allocated 
on the search path, l?i = cj,sj=l 9i,j. Initially, I N  = 4, 
IN" = 4 ,  and = 0, ej  = 0 for all j E { l , Z ,  ..., n}. The 
search is invoked by calling MUCARPC(R, 0). 
Algorithm hIUCARPC(R', g) 
1. If g > p, then IN* t IN  and f; t g 
3. If g + h 5 f*, then return 
4, Choose a bid Bk for which ek = 0 and 
(qz - I?,) > ~ ) , , k .  if no such bid exists, then return 
6. For all B3 such that BJ # Bk and 
(98 - rl - m) c P,~. e3 + eJ + 1 
7. MUCARf'C(R - Skl 9 f (pk - CSES, q t , k ~ t ) )  
9. For all BJ such that B, # Bk and 
(qa - rl - m) 
10. MUGARPG(R ,g) 
11. e k  +- 0, return 
2- h + C3n,q5dl(P3 - C * E S ,  V1,JTZ) 
5 .  I N  c I N  U a,, ek 1 
8. I N ~ I N - B I ,  
vZt3, el + eJ - 1 
In MUCARPC, the profits are guaranteed to be positive 
number by adding a constraint: the revenue collected from 
the bids is no less than the sum of the reserve prices of the 
resources that are allocated to bidders. It can be formalized as 
the definition below: 
Definition: In MUCARPC, if existing 4 satisfies p j  < 
( ~ 1 , j q  + ~ Z , ~ T Z  + ... + 7/'pn,jrpn), Bj will be excluded in the 
preprocessing step, 
Due to each bid bringing fixed profit to auctioneer agents, 
we calculate profits, p j  - CiES, ~ i , j ~ ~ ,  for each bid during the 
preprocessing step. 
much faster, we order bids 
by p j /  
For increasing the value of 
~ i , j  during the preprocessing step. 
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Fig. 1. Execution Time of MUCARPC Algorithm with and without ha with 
Fixed Type of Resources 
V. HEURISTIC FUNCTTON FOR MUCARPC ALGORITHM 
In all of Sandholm's literature, he did not propose algo- 
rithms for WDP of MUCARPC, he did propose heuristic 
functions for WDP of MUCA: 
where ej  = 0 indicating that bid Bj has not been excluded at 
current search node. gi-I'i denotes the un-allocated number of 
units of resource i at current search node. The key idea of this 
heuristic function is to calculate the maximum revenue value 
from the un-allocated resources. Instinctively, we can have a 
heuristic function for our proposed algorithm as follows: 
h2 is the sum of the theoretic maximum profits from 
the un-allocated resources. To verify the feasibility of h2 
for MUCARPC algorithm, experiments were carried out for 
MUCARPC algorithm with and without heuristic function h ~ ,  
The experiments were conducted under the same hardware 
and software environment (IBM Thinkpad T22 XOOMHz with 
256MB RAM, Windows XP, jdk 1.3.1). For the two algo- 
rithms, the same bids were generated and the same preprocess- 
ing step was executed. Without loss of generality, the number 
of units of each resource is randomly chosen from 1 to 100 
in the experiments, and the number of units of each resource 
requiring in each bid is random number from 1 to the number 
of units of each resource. 
The execution time for the type of resources is always 50 
and the number of bids increases by 50 each run is shown in 
Figure 1. The execution time for the number of bids is always 
250 while the type of resources increases by 10 each run is 
shown in Figure 2. The results in Figures 1 and 2 indicate 
that MUCARPC algorithm with hz is drastically slower in 
some cases. With fixed type of resources, the average search 
nodes proportion is 1 : 1.49 in MUCARPC algorithm with 
and without h2; the proportion is 1 : 4.79 with fixed number 
of bids. On the other hand, the execution time proportion is 
24 1 
-Ko*a algorithm without h 
algorithm rith h 
J 
Bids I 
type of resource 
Fig 3 
Fixed Type of R ~ S O U ~ C ~ S  
Execution Time of MUCARPC Algonthm with and without h with 
Fig 2 
Fixed Number of Bids 
Execution Time of MUCARPC AIgonthm with and without h2 with 
1 : 0.135 in MUCARPC algorithm with and without h2 with 
"3nG1 
d 6 o r 1 t h  without h 
-200 - d6orithm rith h "'t fixed type of resources; the-proportion is 1 : 1.19 with fixed number of bids. The experimental results indicate that the nodes in search ,+ 
tree can be reduced with h2, while calculation of hz is very 
time-consuming. Thus we cannot take ha as the heuristic 
function for our algorithm. 
To this end, a new heuristic function h is developed for 
MUCARPC algorithm, which calculates the total profits value 
from the bids that can be added in the search tree at current 
search node. With the new heuristic function h adding in, 
the execution time of MUCARPC algorithm can be reduced 
greatly. The new heuristic function h is described as follows: 
n 
The value of h is the upper bound of profits that can gain 
from current search node. It can be proved as follows: 
Proof: Let Bvseaale be the set of bids which can be added 
in the search tree at current search node, h is the total profits 
of Buaeable. Let Bbest be the set of bids that can bring in 
the maximum profit Vb& in the rest search. It is obvious that 
Bbest 2 Buseable, then &est 5 h holds. 
This completes the proof. 
The heuristic function h can not only reduce search nodes 
but also cut down execution time of the algorithm due to 
the less time spending on calculating the value of h. Similar 
experiments were conducted for MUCARPC with and without 
h. 
From Figures 3 and 4, it is clear that MUCARPC algorithm 
with h is always faster, and in many cases dramatically faster. 
With the heuristic function h, the execution time can be 
reduced as well as the search nodes. The average execution 
time of MUCARPC algorithm with h and without is in the 
proportion of 1 : 2.01 with fixed type of resources; the 
proportion is 1 : 8.87 with fixed number of bids. The average 
search nodes for MUCARPC algorithm with and without h 
is in the proportion of 1 : 2.05 in Figure 3. In Figure 4, the 
IO0 
0 
i 0  20 ' 3 0  40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
type of ,resource 
Fig. 4. 
Fixed Number of Bids 
Execution Time of MUCARPC Atgorithm with and without h with 
proportion is 1 : 9.95. So h is well suited as the heuristic 
function for MUCARPC algorithm. 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The combinatorial auctions mechanisms have extensive ap- 
plications in the resource and task allocation, planning and 
time scheduling in multi-agent systems. This paper described 
the winner determination problem of combinatorial auctions at 
first, and then presented an algorithm for optimal winner de- 
termination of multi-unit combinatorial auctions with reserve 
prices. The algorithm included a new heuristic function h. 
With the new heuristic function h, the execution time of our 
algorithm is reduced greatly* The experimental results show 
that our algorithm is fast when the number of bids is not too 
big. 
In the future work, we will improve our algorithm so that 
it can find the optimal solutions when the number of bids is 
very big. 
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